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PRIOR STATEMENTS OF TESTIFYING 
WITNESSES:  DRAFTING CHOICES 
TO ELIMINATE OR LOOSEN THE STRICTURES 
OF THE HEARSAY RULE 
Daniel J. Capra* 
 
One of the panels at the Symposium on Hearsay Reform—sponsored by 
the Judicial Conference Advisory Committee on Evidence Rules—
considered whether the federal hearsay regime should be changed to 
provide for greater admissibility of prior statements of testifying witnesses.  
This Article is intended to provide some background to the questions 
addressed by the panel and to consider how the Advisory Committee on 
Federal Rules of Evidence (“the Advisory Committee” or “the Committee”) 
might best implement an expansion of admissibility of prior witness 
statements should it decide that such an expansion is warranted. 
Before deciding on an amendment, the Committee will need to work 
through several important substantive decisions.  Among those decisions 
are: 
(1) Should prior statements of testifying witnesses be placed outside 
the hearsay definition—or should an exception be established—
given the fact that the declarant is subject to cross-examination 
about the statement? 
(2) Assuming that prior witness statements remain subject to the 
hearsay rule, should the current exemption in Rule 801(d)(1)(A) 
be expanded to allow for substantive admissibility of all (or 
more, if not all) prior inconsistent statements?  Currently, 
substantive admissibility is extremely limited, applying only to 
those statements that were made under oath at a formal 
proceeding.1 
(3) Assuming that prior statements of testifying witnesses remain 
subject to the hearsay rule, is there any reason to expand the 
exemption for prior consistent statements—Rule 801(d)(1)(B)—
given the recent expansion that became effective in 2014?  The 
2014 amendment provides that if a prior consistent statement is 
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 1. FED. R. EVID. 801(d)(1)(A). 
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properly admitted under Rule 4032 to rehabilitate a witness 
whose credibility has been attacked,3 it is also admissible as 
substantive evidence—i.e., as proof that the content in the 
statement is true.4 
(4) Assuming that prior statements of testifying witnesses remain 
subject to the hearsay rule, is there any reason to alter the 
existing exemption in Rule 801(d)(1)(C) for statements of 
identification?5 
This Article is divided into five parts.  Part I discusses the arguments for 
and against classifying prior statements of testifying witnesses as hearsay.  
Part II discusses the history behind the Federal Rules’ treatment of prior 
inconsistent statements, as well as the different approaches taken in some of 
the states.  Part III provides the history of the Federal Rules’ treatment of 
prior consistent statements, including the 2014 amendment, and discusses 
the possibility of further expansion of admissibility of such statements.  Part 
IV briefly discusses prior statements of identification and considers whether 
any changes to the existing exemption would be useful.  Part V provides 
preliminary drafting alternatives. 
I.  SHOULD PRIOR STATEMENTS OF TESTIFYING WITNESSES 
BE TREATED AS HEARSAY? 
This part considers whether, as a matter of hearsay theory and 
understandable trial practice, it makes sense to treat prior statements of 
testifying witnesses as hearsay.  If the problem of hearsay is solved by 
cross-examination, why should the hearsay rule apply when the statement is 
made by a witness who can be cross-examined? 
A.  Arguments in Favor of Admitting Prior Statements 
of Witnesses As Substantive Evidence 
Federal Rule of Evidence 801(c) defines hearsay as a statement that “the 
declarant does not make while testifying at the current trial or hearing.”6  
Thus, a prior statement of a testifying witness, when offered for its truth, is 
hearsay.  So when the witness says, “I told my cousin that I saw the 
defendant texting while driving and then he ran over the plaintiff,” that is 
not admissible to prove the facts asserted in the statement to the cousin.7 
 
 2. Federal Rule of Evidence 403 provides that evidence may be admitted unless its 
probative value is substantially outweighed by the risk of unfair prejudice, confusion, or 
delay. Id. 403. 
 3. See id. 801(d)(1)(B) advisory committee’s note to the 2014 amendment (noting that 
“to be admissible for rehabilitation, a prior consistent statement must satisfy the strictures of 
Rule 403”). 
 4. Id. 801(d)(1)(B). 
 5. Rule 801(d)(1)(C) provides that a declarant’s statement of identification is 
substantively admissible if the declarant testifies at trial subject to cross-examination. Id. 
801(d)(1)(C). 
 6. Id. 801(c)(1). 
 7. Of course, the witness could also testify to what he saw at the time of the accident, 
and that would not be hearsay. Under the Federal Rule, though, the witness’s statement 
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Many scholars have argued that prior statements of testifying witnesses 
should not be classified as hearsay.  The leading proponent for placing prior 
statements of testifying witnesses outside the hearsay rule was probably 
Professor Edmund Morgan.8  Morgan’s basic argument is that the rule 
against hearsay stems from a concern that the out-of-court declarant’s 
credibility cannot be assessed by the traditional methods of oath, cross-
examination, and view of demeanor.9  But when the declarant is the witness 
at trial, she will be under oath and subject to cross-examination and review 
of demeanor.  Morgan makes this point in his famous article, Hearsay 
Dangers and the Application of the Hearsay Concept: 
When the Declarant is also a witness, it is difficult to justify classifying as 
hearsay evidence of his own prior statements. . . .  The courts declare the 
prior statement to be hearsay because it was not made under oath, subject 
to the penalty for perjury or to the test of cross-examination.  To which 
the answer might well be:  “The declarant as a witness is now under oath 
and now purports to remember and narrate accurately.  The adversary can 
now expose every element that may carry a danger of misleading the trier 
of fact both in the previous statement and in the present testimony, and 
the trier can judge whether both the previous declaration and the present 
testimony are reliable in whole or in part.”10 
Morgan realizes, of course, that at the time the witness made the prior 
statement she was not subjected to cross-examination, oath, or a review of 
demeanor.  But he argues that the existence of these protections at the time 
of trial should suffice.  Morgan observes that if the prior statement is 
consistent with the in-court testimony, it is being affirmed by the witness 
“under oath subject to all sanctions and to cross-examination in the 
presence of the trier who is to value it.”11  As Morgan notes, a prior 
consistent statement might be excluded on the grounds that it is cumulative, 
“but surely the rejection should not be on the ground that the statement 
involves any danger inherent in hearsay.”12 
 
about the prior event is treated no differently than any other declarant’s statement about the 
event.  If it is offered for truth, it is hearsay. 
  One might ask why a party would want to admit a witness’s prior statement about an 
event when the witness can simply testify about the event itself.  The answer is that in many 
cases the in-court testimony of the event has a different evidentiary significance than the 
statement made earlier and closer in time to the event.  Moreover, if the witness has now 
changed his story about the event, the prior (inconsistent) statement obviously has a different 
effect than the in-court testimony. 
 8. Morgan drafted the Model Code of Evidence in 1942. THE YALE BIOGRAPHICAL 
DICTIONARY OF AMERICAN LAW 389 (Roger K. Newman ed., 2009).  The Model Code 
contained a definition of hearsay that covered prior statements of testifying witnesses, but 
further provided that hearsay was admissible whenever the declarant either was “unavailable 
as a witness” or was “present and subject to cross-examination.” MODEL CODE OF EVIDENCE 
r. 801(c) (AM. LAW INST. 1942).  But the provision was not well received at the time. See 
David Sklansky, Hearsay’s Last Hurrah, 2009 SUP. CT. REV. 1, 15–17. 
 9. See generally Edmund Morgan, Hearsay Dangers and the Application of the 
Hearsay Concept, 62 HARV. L. REV. 177 (1948). 
 10. Id. at 192–94. 
 11. Id. at 196. 
 12. Id. 
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But what if the witness denies having made any statement at all?  That 
should not be a problem according to Morgan because the witness “will 
usually swear that he tried to tell the truth in anything that he may have 
said.”13  Thus, cross-examination on that averment will be sufficient to 
regulate any credibility questions as of the time the statement was made.  If, 
on the other hand, the witness concedes that he made the statement but now 
swears that it was not true, the jury, viewing the testimony of the person 
who made both statements, is in a good position to assess which story 
represents the truth in light of all the facts.  Morgan concludes: 
In any of these situations Proponent is not asking Trier to rely upon the 
credibility of anyone who is not present and subject to all the conditions 
imposed upon a witness.  Adversary has all the protection which oath and 
cross-examination can give him.  Trier is in a position to consider the 
evidence impartially and to give it no more than its reasonable persuasive 
effect.  Consequently there is no real reason for classifying the evidence 
as hearsay.14 
Two further points can be made in support of exempting prior statements 
of witnesses from the hearsay rule.  First, the prior statement is by 
definition closer in time to the event described and so is less likely to be 
impaired by faulty memory or a litigation motive.15  Second, treating all 
prior statements of testifying witnesses as outside the hearsay rule would 
dispense with the need to give confusing limiting instructions as to those 
statements that would be admissible anyway for credibility purposes—for 
example, an instruction that “the prior inconsistent statement may not be 
considered as a proof of any fact, but only for its bearing on the credibility 
of the witness.”16  Indeed the interest in avoiding difficult-to-follow 
instructions was the animating reason behind the 2014 amendment to Rule 
801(d)(1)(B) that eliminated the distinction between substantive and 
rehabilitative uses for prior consistent statements. 
 
 13. Id. 
 14. Id. 
 15. See Federal Rules of Evidence:  Hearing on H.R. 5463 Before the S. Comm. on the 
Judiciary, 93d Cong. 65 (1974) (statement of the Standing Comm. on Rules of Practice and 
Procedure and the Advisory Comm. on Rules of Evidence of the Judicial Conf. of the U. S.) 
(“The prior statement was made nearer in time to the events, when memory was fresher and 
intervening influences had not been brought into play.”). 
 16. See Morgan, supra note 9, at 193 (“Furthermore, it must be remembered that the 
trier of fact is often permitted to hear these prior statements to impeach or rehabilitate the 
declarant-witness.  In such event, of course, the trier will be told that he must not treat the 
statement as evidence of the truth of the matter stated.  But to what practical effect? . . .  Do 
the judges deceive themselves or do they realize that they are indulging in a pious fraud?”); 
see also Steven DeBraccio, That’s (Not) What She Said:  The Case for Expanding Admission 
of Prior Inconsistent Statements in New York Criminal Trials, 78 ALB. L. REV. 269, 297 
(2014) (“[I]t would be more beneficial to our trial process to simply allow the jurors to 
consider the evidence as truth and avoid the never-ending discussion on the usefulness of 
limiting instructions.”). 
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B.  Arguments in Favor of Treating Prior Statements 
of Witnesses As Hearsay 
The classic argument for treating prior statements of witnesses as hearsay 
was set forth by Justice Royal A. Stone of the Minnesota Supreme Court in 
State v. Saporen.17  He contended that delayed cross-examination of a 
statement at trial is simply not the same as cross-examination at the time the 
statement is made: 
The chief merit of cross examination is not that at some future time it 
gives the party opponent the right to dissect adverse testimony.  Its 
principal virtue is in its immediate application of the testing process.  Its 
strokes fall while the iron is hot.  False testimony is apt to harden and 
become unyielding to the blows of truth in proportion as the witness has 
opportunity for reconsideration and influence by the suggestions of 
others, whose interest may be, and often is, to maintain falsehood rather 
than truth.18 
The Saporen court’s view of cross-examination at trial as “[striking] 
while the iron is hot” is surely overstated.19  It is not as if an adversary’s 
witness is speaking extemporaneously and off-the-cuff during direct 
testimony.  Trial testimony is usually prepared in advance and elicited in a 
formal question-and-answer format.  For the cross-examiner of a witness at 
trial, the iron is not truly hot.  Put another way, the asserted gap in 
effectiveness between cross-examination about a prior statement and cross-
examination of trial testimony is surely not as wide as the Saporen court 
suggests. 
That said, there is certainly dispute in the profession about the 
comparative effectiveness of delayed cross-examination and cross-
examination of trial testimony.  At the symposium, Professor Saltzburg 
made a strong argument that delayed cross-examination is particularly 
ineffective when the witness denies ever having made a statement.  It must 
be said, however, that the implausibility of such a denial in many 
circumstances—such as when the prior statement was recorded—should cut 
in favor of admissibility of the prior statement because in such cases the 
witness can be cross-examined about that discrepancy.  Moreover, a witness 
should not be allowed to bar admissibility of his prior statement simply by 
declaring falsely that he never made it.  Finally, a witness who denies he 
made a statement is really no different from a witness to an event who 
testifies and denies seeing the event—and yet such a witness’s statement 
about the event is routinely admitted subject to cross-examination. 
Besides the alleged infirmity of delayed cross-examination, there are two 
other arguments that have been put forth in favor of treating prior 
statements of witnesses as hearsay.  The first is illustrated by United States 
v. Check,20 a case decided in the early days of the Federal Rules, in which 
 
 17. 285 N.W. 898 (Minn. 1939). 
 18. Id. at 901. 
 19. Id. 
 20. 582 F.2d 668 (2d Cir. 1978). 
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the prosecution and the trial judge were apparently under the misimpression 
that prior statements of testifying witnesses were not hearsay.  A 
government agent testified to a conversation he had with Check’s 
accomplice.  The testimony was carefully crafted to refer only to what the 
agent had said and not to what the accomplice had said—because that 
would be hearsay.  Here is an example of the agent’s trial testimony: 
I told William Cali at the time I didn’t particularly care whether or not the 
cocaine which I was supposed to get was 70 percent pure, nor the fact that 
it was supposed to come from a captain of detectives[, i.e., Check].21 
The government took the position that the agent’s testimony was not 
hearsay because it referred only to his own prior statements.  So it can be 
argued that if the rule actually were that prior statements of witnesses are 
not hearsay, cases like Check would arise and parties would offer one side 
of a conversation pretextually to prove the other side—that is, not treating 
prior statements of witnesses as hearsay would result in those statements 
serving as conduits and would lead to abuse of the hearsay rule. 
Check demonstrates, however, that this concern is overwrought.  The 
Second Circuit reversed the conviction for two reasons.  First, the trial court 
and the prosecution were wrong to believe that the agent’s own statements 
could not be hearsay just because the agent was testifying.  But even if they 
were right, the agent’s statements should not have been admitted because 
“notwithstanding the artful phrasing . . . [the agent] was on numerous 
occasions throughout his testimony in essence conveying to the jury the 
precise substance of the out-of-court statements Cali made to him.”22  The 
court concluded that “in substance, significant portions of Spinelli’s 
testimony regarding his conversations with Cali were indeed hearsay, for 
that testimony was a transparent attempt to incorporate into the officer’s 
testimony information supplied by the informant who did not testify at 
trial.”23  In other words, even if the hearsay rule is changed to allow 
admission of prior statements of witnesses for their truth, those statements 
would still be excluded if they were being used to carry in hearsay 
statements of other declarants.24 
The other argument in favor of excluding prior witness statements as 
hearsay focuses on prior consistent statements.  If all prior statements could 
be admitted for their truth, there would be an incentive for parties to have 
their witnesses generate consistent statements before trial.  Then the witness 
could be asked on direct examination about all the previous statements that 
he made—to his grandmother, to the church congregation, to the bus driver 
 
 21. Id. at 671. 
 22. Id. at 675. 
 23. Id. at 679. 
 24. See United States v. Meises, 645 F.3d 5, 22 (1st Cir. 2011) (holding that the 
government violated the hearsay rule even though it did not seek to introduce the hearsay 
statements directly; because the statements were effectively before the jury in the context of 
the trial, “any other conclusion would permit the government to evade the limitations of the 
Sixth Amendment and the Rules of Evidence by weaving an unavailable declarant’s 
statements into another witness’s testimony by implication”). 
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on the way to testify, et cetera.  The focus would then be shifted, 
problematically, to the prior statements as opposed to the in-court 
testimony.25 
There are several counterarguments responding to the concern about 
manufactured consistent statements.  First, you do not need an overbroad 
hearsay rule to regulate that problem because litigation-generated extrinsic 
statements can be excluded under Rule 403 as cumulative and unduly 
prejudicial.26  Second, the witness can be cross-examined about the context 
and generation of the consistent statements.27  Third, this concern about 
overuse of consistent statements, even if valid, should not lead to a rule that 
all prior statements are hearsay; there is no risk of witnesses manufacturing 
inconsistent statements, for example, and so the concern about generating 
evidence is localized and should be addressed to prior consistent statements 
only. 
There is a fourth argument against admitting prior witness statements in 
criminal cases that can be dismissed:  admitting a prior statement of a 
witness against a criminal defendant violates his right to confrontation.  The 
Supreme Court has rejected that argument in at least three cases, finding 
that an opportunity to cross-examine the witness about his prior statement 
satisfies the Confrontation Clause.28 
In sum, there is much to be said for a rule that exempts prior witness 
statements from the hearsay rule.  At the very least, there is a strong case 
for broader admissibility of prior inconsistent statements.  It is notable that 
such a broader approach has been taken in a number of states.  A few 
jurisdictions admit all prior statements of witnesses for their truth.  For 
example, Kansas states its hearsay rule and then provides an exception for 
all prior statements of testifying witnesses: 
60-460.  Hearsay evidence excluded; exceptions.  Evidence of a statement 
which is made other than by a witness while testifying at the hearing, 
offered to prove the truth of the matter stated, is hearsay evidence and 
inadmissible except: 
a. Previous statements of persons present.  A statement previously 
made by a person who is present at the hearing and available for 
 
 25. See State v. Saporen, 285 N.W. 898, 901 (Minn. 1939) (noting that the “practical 
reason” for treating prior witness statements as hearsay is that it would create temptation and 
opportunity to manufacture evidence). 
 26. The corresponding response to the Rule 403 argument is that the rule is highly 
discretionary and only operates to exclude evidence where its probative value is substantially 
outweighed by the risk of prejudice, confusion, and delay. 
 27. The response here is, once again, that cross-examination must strike while the iron is 
hot. 
 28. See Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 59 n.9 (2004) (“Finally, we reiterate that, 
when the declarant appears for cross-examination at trial, the Confrontation Clause places no 
constraints at all on the use of his prior testimonial statements. . . .  The Clause does not bar 
admission of a statement so long as the declarant is present at trial to defend or explain it.”); 
United States v. Owens, 484 U.S. 554 (1988) (finding no confrontation violation where 
witness was subject to cross-examination about his prior statement of identification, even 
though he had no memory about why he made the identification); California v. Green, 399 
U.S. 149 (1970) (rejecting confrontation claim where the defendant had an opportunity to 
cross-examine a prosecution witness about the witness’s prior statement). 
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cross-examination with respect to the statement and its subject 
matter, provided the statement would be admissible if made by 
declarant while testifying as a witness.29 
Similarly, Puerto Rico provides in a hearsay exception for substantive 
admissibility for all prior statements of testifying witnesses: 
Rule 63. Prior statement by witness.  As an exception to the hearsay rule, 
a prior statement made by a witness who appears at a trial or hearing and 
who is subject to cross-examination as to the prior statement is 
admissible, provided that such statement is admissible if made by the 
declarant appearing as witness.30 
Similarly, the Delaware Code provides that any voluntary prior statement 
of a testifying witness “may be used as affirmative evidence with 
substantive independent testimonial value” and the party need not show 
surprise.31 
There is nothing to indicate that the sky has fallen or that advocacy has 
been impaired as a result of more liberal admissibility in these jurisdictions. 
II.  PRIOR INCONSISTENT STATEMENTS 
This part evaluates the tortured history of the current Federal Rule on 
prior inconsistent statements under the hearsay rule.  We will see that while 
the Advisory Committee’s proposal was a correct application of hearsay 
theory, Congress had the last word. 
A.  How Did We Get Here?: 
The History of Federal Rule 801(d)(1)(A) 
The common law approach to prior inconsistent statements was that they 
were hearsay and were admissible only to impeach the declarant-witness.  
The original Advisory Committee thought that the common law rule, 
distinguishing between impeachment and substantive use of prior 
inconsistent statements, was “troublesome.”32  It noted that the major 
concern of the hearsay rule is that an out-of-court statement could not be 
tested for reliability because the person who made the statement could not 
be cross-examined about it.  But with prior inconsistent statements, “[t]he 
declarant is in court and may be examined and cross-examined in regard to 
his statements and their subject matter.”33  And the Committee thought that 
it had never been “satisfactorily explained why cross-examination [could 
not] be conducted subsequently with success.”34  Moreover, “The trier of 
fact has the declarant before it and can observe his demeanor and the nature 
of his testimony as he denies or tries to explain away the inconsistency.”35  
 
 29. KAN. STAT. ANN. § 60-460 (2015). 
 30. P.R. LANS. ANN. tit. 32, Ap. N (2015). 
 31. DEL. CODE. ANN. tit. 11, § 3507 (2015). 
 32. FED. R. EVID. 801(d)(2)(A) advisory committee’s note. 
 33. Id. 
 34. Id. 
 35. Id. 
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Finally, “the inconsistent statement is more likely to be true than the 
testimony of the witness at the trial because it was made nearer in time to 
the matter to which it relates and is less likely to be influenced by the 
controversy that gave rise to the litigation.”36 
For all these reasons, the Advisory Committee’s proposed Rule 
801(d)(1)(A) would have exempted all prior inconsistent statements of 
testifying witnesses from the hearsay rule.  The Advisory Committee’s note 
to the proposal makes this clear:  “Prior inconsistent statements traditionally 
have been admissible to impeach but not as substantive evidence.  Under 
the rule they are substantive evidence.”37 
Congress, however, cut back significantly on the Advisory Committee 
proposal.  In the form ultimately adopted, Rule 801(d)(1)(A) states that only 
those prior inconsistent statements “given under penalty of perjury at a trial, 
hearing, or other proceeding or in a deposition” are admissible as 
substantive evidence.38  The rationales for this limitation, as expressed by 
the House Committee on the Judiciary, are that:  1) if the statement was 
given under oath at a formal proceeding, “there can be no dispute as to 
whether the prior statement was made”; and 2) the requirements of oath and 
formality of proceeding “provide firm additional assurances of the 
reliability of the prior statement.”39 
There are problems with the rationales for Congress’s tightening of the 
hearsay exception for prior inconsistent statements.  The first congressional 
concern—that the statement may never have been made—is not a hearsay 
concern.  Whether the statement was made (as distinguished from whether 
it is true) is a question ordinarily addressed by in-court regulators—the in-
court witness to the statement testifies and is cross-examined, or other 
admissible evidence is presented that the statement was or was not made; 
this becomes a jury question.40  Really, Congress’s argument proves too 
much, because admitting any out-of-court statement raises the question of 
whether it was ever made.  Why do we find the in-court witness’s testimony 
that the statement was made in all other situations sufficient, but question 
the in-court testimony with respect to prior inconsistent statements?41  
Second, the requirements of oath and formality surely do add reliable 
circumstances, and thus these requirements do respond to a hearsay 
concern.  But the fact is that the witness is now under oath at trial, subject 
to cross-examination.  That should be a sufficient guarantee of reliability, 
and adding the oath and formality requirements raise the admissibility 
 
 36. Id. 
 37. Id. 
 38. Id. 801(d)(1)(A). 
 39. H.R. REP. NO. 93-650, at 13 (1973), as reprinted in 1974 U.S.C.C.A.N. 7051, 7087. 
 40. Of course, the inconsistent statement could be proven up through hearsay subject to 
an exception, such as a business record, FED R. EVID. 803(6), or public record, id. 803(8).  
The point is that concerns about whether the statement was ever made are not a reason, 
under the hearsay rule, to exclude the statement itself. 
 41. Even if the concern about manufactured prior statements were legitimate, it would 
not need to be regulated by the requirements of oath at a formal proceeding.  A less onerous 
requirement, such as that the statement was recorded, should surely suffice. 
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hurdle for prior inconsistent statements much higher than for most of the 
other hearsay exceptions. 
The end result of this congressional intervention is to render the hearsay 
exception for prior inconsistent statements relatively useless.  It goes 
without saying that the vast majority of prior inconsistent statements are not 
made under oath at a formal proceeding.  Essentially, the only function for 
Rule 801(d)(1)(A) is to protect the proponent (usually the government) 
from having its substantive case sapped by turncoat witnesses.  Congress’s 
rationales for adding the oath and formality requirements are simply not 
strong enough to justify gutting the exception proposed by the Advisory 
Committee.  This is especially so because the limitation comes with 
significant negative consequences, including the following: 
(1) Excluding testimony as hearsay even though the declarant can be 
cross-examined; 
(2) Requiring a difficult-to-follow jury instruction, specifically, that 
the statement can be used only to impeach the witness but not for 
its truth—even though in many cases its impeachment value is 
dependent on it being true; 
(3) Raising the possibility that parties will seek to evade the rule by 
calling witnesses to “impeach” them with prior inconsistent 
statements with the hope that the jury will use the statements as 
proof of the matter asserted.  That will require the courts to 
investigate and determine the motivation of the proponent for 
calling the witness (motivation that would be irrelevant if the 
prior statement were substantively admissible);42 and 
(4) Raising the possibility that prior inconsistent statements not 
admissible for truth under Rule 801(d)(1)(A) will still be found 
admissible for truth under the residual exception (Rule 807) 
anyway.  Federal Rule 807 provides that a hearsay statement not 
admissible under any other exception might nonetheless be 
admitted if it is trustworthy and if other stated admissibility 
requirements are met.43  As applied to Rule 801(d)(1)(A), a 
proponent might argue that a prior inconsistent statement is 
admissible for its truth because it is reliable, even if it was not 
made under oath at a formal proceeding—and the reliability 
 
 42. See, e.g., United States v. Ince, 21 F.3d 576, 578 (4th Cir. 1994) (finding 
government’s impeachment of its witness with a prior inconsistent statement was improper 
where “the only apparent purpose” for the impeachment “was to circumvent the hearsay rule 
and to expose the jury to otherwise inadmissible evidence”); cf. United States v. Kane, 944 
F.2d 1406, 1412 (7th Cir. 1991) (ruling impeachment with a prior inconsistent statement was 
improper where the prosecution had no reason to think that the witness would be hostile or 
would create the need to impeach her); see also People v. Fitzpatrick, 40 N.Y.2d 44, 49, 50 
n.1 (1976) (noting the concern that “the prosecution might misuse impeachment techniques 
to get before a jury material which could not otherwise be put in evidence because of its 
extrajudicial nature”; also noting that “a number of authorities have pointed out that the 
potential for prejudice in the out-of-court statements may be exaggerated in cases where the 
person making the statement is in court and available for cross-examination”). 
 43. FED. R. EVID. 807. 
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would be, ironically, that the declarant was subject to cross-
examination about the prior statement.44 
B.  State Variations 
In deciding whether to expand the admissibility of prior inconsistent 
statements, there are many reference points provided in the state rules of 
evidence.  It is particularly notable that a large number of states have 
rejected the congressional limitation on substantive admissibility of prior 
inconsistent statements—the state deviation is far greater than that with 
respect to most of the other Federal Rules of Evidence. 
1.  Rejection of Congressional Limitation in Rule 801(d)(1)(B) 
Many of the states did not adopt the congressional limitation on 
substantive admissibility of prior inconsistent statements.  In the following 
states, prior inconsistent statements are admissible for their truth: 
 
Alaska45 
Arizona46 
California47 
Colorado48 
Delaware49 
Georgia50 
Montana51 
Nevada52 
Rhode Island53 
South Carolina54 
Wisconsin55 
 
 44. See, e.g., United States v. Valdez-Soto, 31 F.3d 1467, 1472 (9th Cir. 1994) (finding 
a prior inconsistent statement not under oath to be properly admitted as substantive evidence 
under the residual exception and noting that “the degree of reliability necessary for 
admission is greatly reduced where, as here, the declarant is testifying and is available for 
cross-examination, thereby satisfying the central concern of the hearsay rule” (quoting 
United States v. McPartlin, 595 F.2d 1321, 1350–51 (7th Cir. 1979))). 
 45. ALASKA R. EVID. 801(d)(1)(A). 
 46. ARIZ. R. EVID. 801(d)(1)(a). 
 47. CAL. EV. CODE § 1235. 
 48. COLO. R. EVID. 801(d)(1)(A). 
 49. DEL. R. EVID. 801(d)(1)(A). 
 50. GA. R. EVID. 801(d)(1)(A). 
 51. MONT. R. EVID. 801(d)(1)(A). 
 52. 4 NEV. STAT. § 51.035(2)(A). 
 53. R.I. R. EVID. 801(d)(1)(A). 
 54. S.C. R. EVID. 801(d)(1)(A). 
 55. WIS. R. EVID. 801(d)(1)(A). 
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2.  Variations Short of Outright Rejection 
of the Congressional Limitation 
Other states provide less onerous alternatives to the congressional 
restriction on substantive admissibility of prior inconsistent statements.  For 
example, Arkansas requires prior oath at a formal proceeding for civil cases 
only.56  Connecticut addresses the concern about whether the statement was 
ever made with a narrower limitation.  The exception covers 
[a] prior inconsistent statement of a witness, provided (A) the statement is 
in writing or otherwise recorded by audiotape, videotape, or some other 
equally reliable medium, (B) the writing or recording is duly 
authenticated as that of the witness, and (C) the witness has personal 
knowledge of the contents of the statement.57 
Requirements (B) and (C) are surplusage because they are covered by 
other rules (authentication by Rule 901 and personal knowledge by Rule 
602).  But the Connecticut version does suggest a compromise approach 
that might be employed—which would expand the exception so long as 
there is assurance that the prior inconsistent statement was actually made.  
Again, whether it was made is not a hearsay problem, but a provision 
requiring that the statement be recorded, signed, et cetera would satisfy 
those whose concern is about witnesses (such as police officers) cooking up 
prior inconsistent statements of other witnesses. 
Hawaii similarly expands the exception beyond the congressional 
limitation, while still addressing concerns that the statement was never 
made.  Besides statements under oath at a prior proceeding, Hawaii 
provides substantive admissibility for prior inconsistent statements when 
they are “reduced to writing and signed or otherwise adopted or approved 
by the declarant” and also when they are “recorded in substantially 
verbatim fashion by stenographic, mechanical, electrical, or other means 
contemporaneously with the making of the statement.”58 
Illinois, similar to Connecticut, addresses the concern that the statement 
was never made.  Prior inconsistent statements are admissible substantively 
if properly recorded, but Illinois also includes as a ground for admissibility 
that “the declarant acknowledged under oath the making of the statement 
either in the declarant’s testimony at the hearing or trial in which the 
admission into evidence of the prior statement is being sought or at a trial, 
hearing, or other proceeding, or in a deposition.”59  Illinois thus adds an 
interesting addition—the statement does not need to be recorded if the 
declarant acknowledges making the statement while testifying at trial.  That 
is a completely justifiable proposition because there should be no doubt 
about the prior statement if the declarant actually acknowledges making it. 
 
 56. ARK. R. EVID. 801(d)(1)(i). 
 57. CONN. CODE EVID. R. 8-5. 
 58. HAWAII R. EVID. 802.1(1)(B)–(C). 
 59. ILL. R. EVID. 801(d)(1)(A). 
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Louisiana does not permit substantive use of prior inconsistent statements 
in a civil cases.60  Prior inconsistent statements are admissible substantively 
in a criminal case, “provided that the proponent has first fairly directed the 
witness’[s] attention to the statement and the witness has been given the 
opportunity to admit the fact and where there exists any additional evidence 
to corroborate the matter asserted by the prior inconsistent statement.”61 
Maryland has a provision similar to Connecticut, allowing substantive 
use of a prior inconsistent statement if there is assurance that it was actually 
made.  Such statements are admissible if they have been “reduced to writing 
and . . . signed by the declarant” or “recorded in substantially verbatim 
fashion by stenographic or electronic means contemporaneously with the 
making of the statement.”62 
New Jersey provides for substantive admissibility of all prior inconsistent 
statements of a witness called by an opposing party.  However, if the 
witness is called by the proponent, safeguards must be met.  The proponent 
must show that the statement “(A) is contained in a sound recording or in a 
writing made or signed by the witness in circumstances establishing its 
reliability or (B) was given under oath subject to the penalty of perjury at a 
trial or other judicial, quasi-judicial, legislative, administrative or grand jury 
proceeding, or in a deposition.”63  Assuming there are risks of reliability 
and questions about whether the statement was ever made, it is unclear why 
those risks are only raised when the proponent calls the witness. 
North Dakota applies the congressional limitation in Rule 801(d)(1)(A) 
in criminal cases only.64 
Pennsylvania, like Connecticut, expands beyond the congressional 
limitation but requires a showing that the prior inconsistent statement was 
actually made: 
(1)  Prior Inconsistent Statement of Declarant-Witness.  A prior statement 
by a declarant-witness that is inconsistent with the declarant-witness’s 
testimony and: 
(A) was given under oath subject to the penalty of perjury at a trial, 
hearing, or other proceeding, or in a deposition; 
(B) is a writing signed and adopted by the declarant; or 
(C) is a verbatim contemporaneous electronic, audiotaped, or 
videotaped recording of an oral statement.65 
Utah rejects the congressional limitation and also treats prior statements 
as not hearsay when the witness denies or has forgotten the statement.  So 
there appears to be no concern at all in Utah about whether the prior 
inconsistent statement was ever made: 
(d)  Statements That Are Not Hearsay.  A statement that meets the 
following conditions is not hearsay: 
 
 60. LA. CODE EVID. 801(d)(1)(A). 
 61. Id. 
 62. MD. R. EVID. 5-802.1. 
 63. N.J. R. EVID. 803(a)(1). 
 64. N.D. R. EVID. 801(d)(1)(A). 
 65. PA. R. EVID. 803.1. 
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(1) A Declarant-Witness’s Prior Statement.  The declarant testifies 
and is subject to cross-examination about a prior statement, and 
the statement: 
(A) is inconsistent with the declarant’s testimony or the 
declarant denies having made the statement or has 
forgotten . . . .66 
Wyoming applies the congressional limitation only in criminal cases.67 
III.  PRIOR CONSISTENT STATEMENTS 
 This part considers whether the current treatment of prior consistent 
statements in the hearsay rule needs to be revisited.  As we will see, any 
attempt to change the existing Rule would run into some very recent 
history. 
A.  A Short History of Rule 801(d)(1)(B), 
Ending with the 2014 Amendment 
The original Advisory Committee’s proposed rule creating a hearsay 
exemption for certain prior consistent statements turned out to be far less 
controversial in Congress than the Committee’s proposal to admit all prior 
inconsistent statements.  Part of the reason for the different treatment is that 
the substantive use of prior consistent statements is simply less important.  
Treating inconsistent statements as substantive evidence can provide 
enough for the party with the burden of proof to withstand motions to 
dismiss for lack of evidence.  In contrast, the difference between 
substantive and credibility-based use of prior consistent statements is 
evanescent—the witness has already testified, thus providing substantive 
evidence; the additional fact that the witness made a prior consistent 
statement will usually make little or no substantive difference.  So there was 
not much to get worked up about when it came to consistent statements.  As 
Judge Friendly stated:  “It is not entirely clear why the Advisory Committee 
felt it necessary to provide for admissibility of certain prior consistent 
statements as affirmative evidence” because the difference between 
substantive and rehabilitative use is ephemeral.68 
But the Advisory Committee did carve out certain consistent statements 
for substantive use.  The Committee Note explaining the provision is terse:  
“The prior statement is consistent with the testimony given on the stand, 
and, if the opposite party wishes to open the door for its admission in 
evidence [by attacking the credibility of the witness-declarant], no sound 
reason is apparent why it should not be received generally.”69 
The problem with the original Rule 801(d)(1)(B) was that it provided for 
substantive admissibility of only some, and not all, consistent statements 
that are properly admitted to rehabilitate a witness.  The original rule 
 
 66. UTAH R. EVID. 801(d). 
 67. WYO. R. EVID. 801(d)(1)(A). 
 68. United States v. Rubin, 609 F.2d 51, 70 n.4 (2d Cir. 1979) (Friendly, J., concurring). 
 69. FED. R. EVID. 801(d)(1)(B) advisory committee’s note. 
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provided for substantive admissibility only when the witness was attacked 
for having a bad motive or for recent fabrication—and then only when the 
statement predated the existence of the motive or the interest to fabricate.70  
Other consistent statements can rehabilitate, and the same justification for 
substantive admissibility can be made:  the party has opened the door by 
attacking the witness, and the consistent statement rebuts the attack.  The 
Advisory Committee Note to the 2014 amendment explains the problem of 
the too-narrow focus of the original rule, as well as the solution that the 
current Advisory Committee provided.  The Committee Note explains as 
follows: 
 Though the original Rule 801(d)(1)(B) provided for substantive use of 
certain prior consistent statements, the scope of that Rule was limited.  
The Rule covered only those consistent statements that were offered to 
rebut charges of recent fabrication or improper motive or influence.  The 
Rule did not, for example, provide for substantive admissibility of 
consistent statements that are probative to explain what otherwise appears 
to be an inconsistency in the witness’s testimony.  Nor did it cover 
consistent statements that would be probative to rebut a charge of faulty 
memory.  Thus, the Rule left many prior consistent statements potentially 
admissible only for the limited purpose of rehabilitating a witness’s 
credibility.  The original Rule also led to some conflict in the cases; some 
courts distinguished between substantive and rehabilitative use for prior 
consistent statements, while others appeared to hold that prior consistent 
statements must be admissible under Rule 801(d)(1)(B) or not at all. 
. . . 
 The intent of the amendment is to extend substantive effect to 
consistent statements that rebut other attacks on a witness—such as the 
charges of inconsistency or faulty memory.71 
The Advisory Committee Note makes a point of emphasizing the limited 
scope of the amendment.  It does not provide for admission of more prior 
consistent statements.  It simply makes all prior consistent statements that 
are traditionally admissible for rehabilitation purposes also admissible for 
the truth of the matter asserted. 
The amendment does not change the traditional and well-accepted limits 
on bringing prior consistent statements before the fact finder for credibility 
purposes.  It does not allow impermissible bolstering of a witness.  As 
before, prior consistent statements under the amendment may be brought 
before the fact finder only if they properly rehabilitate a witness whose 
credibility has been attacked.  As before, to be admissible for rehabilitation, 
a prior consistent statement must also satisfy the strictures of Rule 403.  As 
before, the trial court has ample discretion to exclude prior consistent 
statements that are cumulative accounts of an event.  The amendment does 
not make any consistent statement admissible that was not admissible 
 
 70. Tome v. United States, 513 U.S. 150 (1995). 
 71. FED. R. EVID. 801(d)(1)(B) advisory committee’s note to 2014 amendment. 
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previously—the only difference is that prior consistent statements otherwise 
admissible for rehabilitation are now admissible substantively as well. 
So, Rule 801(d)(1)(B), as amended in 2014, provides as follows: 
(d)  Statements That Are Not Hearsay.  A statement that meets the 
following conditions is not hearsay: 
(1) A Declarant-Witness’[s] Prior Statement.  The declarant testifies 
and is subject to cross-examination about a prior statement, and 
the statement: 
. . . 
(B) is consistent with the declarant’s testimony and is offered: 
(i) to rebut an express or implied charge that the 
declarant recently fabricated it or acted from a 
recent improper influence or motive in so testifying; 
or 
(ii) to rehabilitate the declarant’s credibility as a 
witness when attacked on another ground . . . .72 
The intended effect of the amendment is to do away with the need to 
provide an unhelpful limiting instruction for all prior consistent statements 
that are admissible to rehabilitate the witness’s credibility.  No longer need 
an instruction—for example, that “the statement that the witness made can 
be used only insofar as it explains his inconsistent statement and not for the 
truth of any assertion in the consistent statement”—be given.  These 
limiting instructions were considered not worth the candle due to their 
inherent difficulty and the lack of a practical distinction between 
substantive and credibility use of prior consistent statements. 
The recency of the amendment to Rule 801(d)(1)(B) necessarily has an 
effect on what the Advisory Committee should do with respect to 
admissibility of prior consistent statements.  Certainly any limiting of the 
scope of substantive admissibility under Rule 801(d)(1)(B) should not be 
undertaken in light of a so-recent expansion.  But it would seem at least 
possible to consider further expanding the admissibility of prior consistent 
statements in ways that are different from the path chosen by the Advisory 
Committee in the 2014 amendment. 
One possibility would be to untether substantive admissibility from 
admissibility to rehabilitate.  That would be the upshot of an amendment 
that would treat all prior witness statements as exempt from the hearsay 
rule.  But tying admissibility of prior consistent statements to rehabilitation 
of credibility has the virtue of avoiding the problem of parties trying to 
manufacture consistent statements for trial.  (That would be “impermissible 
bolstering” in lawyer-speak.)  And the current tie to rehabilitation has the 
further virtue of being grounded in the policy of “opening the door”—
admissibility is dependent on an attack on the witness’s credibility.  If 
substantive admissibility were untethered from rehabilitation, then the 
opponent would lose the control over admissibility that the original 
Advisory Committee found to be important.  For these reasons and others 
 
 72. Id. 801(d)(1)(B) (emphasis added). 
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articulately raised by Professor Liesa Richter at the symposium, prior 
consistent statements are better left where they are—the 2014 amendment 
has done good work, and there is no sufficient reason to provide for greater 
admissibility of prior consistent statements. 
IV.  PRIOR STATEMENTS OF IDENTIFICATION 
The Advisory Committee Note to Rule 801(d)(1)(C) explains the reason 
for carving out an exception for prior statements of identification:  the prior 
identification is more reliable than the in-court identification because it was 
made “at an earlier time under less suggestive conditions.”73  This 
explanation is further supported by the fact that the identifying witness must 
be subject to cross-examination and that cross-examination in this particular 
circumstance can be quite useful because the witness can be asked not only 
about the process of identification, but also about the basis that the witness 
had for making the identification in the first place (how far away he was 
from the robbery, whether he was wearing his glasses, etc.). 
Interestingly, the Senate initially rejected the proposed Rule 
801(d)(1)(C); the House acquiesced to that rejection in order to ensure 
passage of the Rules of Evidence.74  The Senate had deleted the provision 
because of strenuous objection by Senator Sam Ervin.  He was concerned 
that a conviction could be based solely on an unsworn hearsay statement in 
which the declarant identified the defendant.75 
But Congress then amended Rule 801(d)(1) in 1975 to add back the 
Advisory Committee’s proposal.76  The report from the Senate Judiciary 
Committee found that Senator Ervin’s concerns were “misdirected.”77  The 
report makes four points:  1) the rule is addressed to admissibility, not 
sufficiency; 2) most of the hearsay exceptions allow statements into 
evidence that were not made under oath; 3) the declarant is testifying 
subject to cross-examination, assuring that “if any discrepancy occurs 
between the witness’[s] in-court and out-of-court testimony, the opportunity 
is available to probe, with the witness under oath, the reasons for that 
discrepancy so that the trier of fact might determine which statement is to 
be believed”; and 4) the identification must pass constitutional muster under 
the Supreme Court cases regulating identifications, et cetera, thus 
guaranteeing some reliability.78 
In practice, Rule 801(d)(1)(C) has proved relatively uncontroversial.  
Perhaps the most contested point was resolved by the Supreme Court in 
United States v. Owens,79 which allowed admission of a prior identification 
 
 73. Id. 801(d)(1)(C) advisory committee’s note. 
 74. CONG. REC. 9653 (Oct. 6, 1975) (statement of Rep. Hungate). 
 75. CONG. REC. 9654 (Oct. 6, 1975) (statement of Rep. Wiggins). 
 76. Pub. L. No. 94-113, 89 Stat. 576 (1975). 
 77. S. REP. NO. 94-199, at 2 (1975). 
 78. Id.  For treatment of the Supreme Court cases on the process of eyewitness 
identification, see Chapter 4 of STEPHEN A. SALTZBURG AND DANIEL J. CAPRA, AMERICAN 
CRIMINAL PROCEDURE:  CASES AND COMMENTARY (10th ed. 2014). 
 79. 484 U.S. 554 (1988). 
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even though the witness had no memory about the reasons for making that 
identification.  The witness without memory was found “subject to cross-
examination” within the meaning of the Rule.80  There appears to be no 
groundswell for reconsidering Owens by way of amendment to the 
Evidence Rules.  Nor should there be, as a faulty memory can well be the 
target for effective cross-examination, and it would be difficult if not 
impossible to craft a rule that would set forth criteria for when an attack on 
faulty memory will or will not be productive in an individual case. 
Insofar as prior statements of identification are concerned, the only 
possibility of amendment that would appear to be on the table would be the 
broad approach, discussed above, of making all prior statements of 
testifying witnesses substantively admissible.  Short of that, it would appear 
that the existing Rule 801(d)(1)(C) is working well and should be retained. 
V.  DRAFTING ALTERNATIVES 
There are essentially three ways to expand the substantive admissibility 
of prior statements of witnesses (assuming, of course, that the Advisory 
Committee agrees that some kind of expansion of admissibility is justified).  
The first is the broad approach that would lift the hearsay ban from all prior 
statements of witnesses—which, as noted above, may be too extreme a 
remedy, as it would expand admission of prior consistent statements, a 
move that does not seem supportable at this time.  The second is to lift the 
congressional bar on substantive use of most prior inconsistent statements, 
set forth in Rule 801(d)(1)(A)—this is a more targeted attack, directed to 
the misguided limitations imposed by Congress on the substantive 
admissibility of prior inconsistent statements.  And the third is to narrow the 
ban in Rule 801(d)(1)(A) to situations in which there is some guarantee 
provided (short of oath at a formal proceeding) that the inconsistent 
statement was actually made.  This part provides drafting alternatives for 
each of these approaches.81 
A.  Lifting the Hearsay Ban on Prior Statements of Witnesses 
There appear to be two possible ways to lift the hearsay ban on prior 
statements of witnesses.  The first is to change the hearsay definition; the 
second is to provide an exception. 
1.  Changing the Hearsay Definition 
Changing the hearsay definition might be tricky, but something like this 
may work: 
Rule 801.  Definitions That Apply to This Article; Exclusions from 
Hearsay. 
 
 80. Id. at 561. 
 81. Additions to the current Rule are denoted in bold typeface; deletions are stricken out. 
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(a) Statement.  “Statement” means a person’s oral assertion, written 
assertion, or nonverbal conduct, if the person intended it as an 
assertion. 
(b) Declarant.  “Declarant” means the person who made the 
statement. 
(c) Hearsay.  “Hearsay” means a statement that: 
(1) the declarant does not make while testifying—unless 
subject to cross-examination about it—at the current 
trial or hearing; and 
(2) a party offers in evidence to prove the truth of the matter 
asserted in the statement. 
(d) Statements That Are Not Hearsay.  A statement that meets the 
following conditions is not hearsay: 
(1) [Now covered in Rule 801(c)(1)] A Declarant-Witness’s 
Prior Statement.  The declarant testifies and is subject to 
cross-examination about a prior statement, and the 
statement: 
(A) is inconsistent with the declarant’s testimony and 
was given under penalty of perjury at a trial, 
hearing, or other proceeding or in a deposition; 
(B) is consistent with the declarant’s testimony and is 
offered: 
(i) to rebut an express or implied charge 
that the declarant recently fabricated it 
or acted from a recent improper 
influence or motive in so testifying; or 
(ii) to rehabilitate the declarant’s credibility 
as a witness when attacked on another 
ground; or 
(C) identifies a person as someone the declarant 
perceived earlier. 
(2) An Opposing Party’s Statement.  The statement is offered 
against an opposing party and: 
(A) was made by the party in an individual or 
representative capacity; 
(B) is one the party manifested that it adopted or 
believed to be true; 
(C) was made by a person whom the party authorized 
to make a statement on the subject; 
(D) was made by the party’s agent or employee on a 
matter within the scope of that relationship and 
while it existed; or 
(E) was made by the party’s coconspirator during and 
in furtherance of the conspiracy. 
The statement must be considered but does not by itself 
establish the declarant’s authority under (C); the existence 
or scope of the relationship under (D); or the existence of 
the conspiracy or participation in it under (E). 
Reporter’s Observations: 
(1)  If you agree with Morgan’s arguments, then taking prior witness 
statements out of the definition of hearsay is analytically correct.  It 
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is not hearsay because the solution to hearsay is cross-examination 
and the declarant here is subject to cross-examination (albeit 
delayed) about their own statement.  On the other hand, a prior 
statement of a testifying witness, when offered for its truth, does fit 
the classic definition of hearsay:  it is a statement made out of court 
that is offered for its truth.  Further, the fix of adding the language 
in the middle of the hearsay rule seems awkward; it is like dropping 
a rock into an otherwise quiet pool.  So perhaps it is better to think 
about a hearsay exception for prior witness statements, as the 
jurisdictions that admit all prior witness statements substantively 
have done—for example, the Kansas and Puerto Rico exceptions.82 
(2)  The other problem with changing the definition and not making an 
exception is that the change would create a gaping hole where Rule 
801(d)(1) used to be.  This is not fatal, but it does look a bit odd.  
And it poses a challenge for electronic searches of case law 
involving prior witness statements—the case law essentially shifts 
midstream from Rule 801(d)(1) to Rule 801(c). 
(3)  If Rule 801(d)(1) is abrogated, this does not mean that Rule 
801(d)(2) should be moved up.  That would create even more havoc 
for electronic searches and settled expectations.  The protocol for 
evidence rulemaking is that if a rule is abrogated or moved, the 
former number is left open, with an instruction as to where the rule 
went.  For instance, see the gap between Rule 804(b)(4) and 
804(b)(6), which was caused when Rule 804(b)(5) was moved to 
Rule 807 as part of a combined residual exception.83 
2.  A Hearsay Exception for All Prior Witness Statements 
A hearsay exception for prior witness statements is probably best placed 
in Rule 801(d) itself; that is certainly the least disruptive fix: 
Rule 801.  Definitions That Apply to This Article; Exclusions from 
Hearsay. 
(a) Statement.  “Statement” means a person’s oral assertion, written 
assertion, or nonverbal conduct, if the person intended it as an 
assertion. 
(b) Declarant.  “Declarant” means the person who made the 
statement. 
(c) Hearsay.  “Hearsay” means a statement that: 
(1) the declarant does not make while testifying at the current 
trial or hearing; and 
(2) a party offers in evidence to prove the truth of the matter 
asserted in the statement. 
 
 82. See supra notes 29–30 and accompanying text. 
 83. The instruction now seen under Rule 804(b)(5) states:  “Transferred to Rule 807.”  
That language will not work if prior statements of witnesses are now placed outside hearsay 
proscription by a change to Rule 801(c).  That is because Rule 801(d)(1) would not be 
“transferred” lock, stock, and barrel in the way that Rule 804(b)(5) was.  That is why the 
bracketed material reads, “Now covered in Rule 801(c)(1).” 
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(d) Statements That Are Not Hearsay.  A statement that meets the 
following conditions is not hearsay: 
(1) A Declarant-Witness’s Prior Statement.  The declarant 
testifies and is subject to cross-examination about a the 
prior statement, provided the statement would be 
admissible if made by the declarant while testifying as 
a witness., and the statement: 
(A) is inconsistent with the declarant’s testimony and 
was given under penalty of perjury at a trial, 
hearing, or other proceeding or in a deposition; 
(B) is consistent with the declarant’s testimony and is 
offered: 
(i) to rebut an express or implied charge 
that the declarant recently fabricated it 
or acted from a recent improper 
influence or motive in so testifying; or 
(ii) to rehabilitate the declarant’s credibility 
as a witness when attacked on another 
ground; or 
(C) identifies a person as someone the declarant 
perceived earlier. 
(2) An Opposing Party’s Statement.  The statement is offered 
against an opposing party and: 
(A) was made by the party in an individual or 
representative capacity; 
(B) is one the party manifested that it adopted or 
believed to be true; 
(C) was made by a person whom the party authorized 
to make a statement on the subject; 
(D) was made by the party’s agent or employee on a 
matter within the scope of that relationship and 
while it existed; or 
(E) was made by the party’s coconspirator during and 
in furtherance of the conspiracy. 
The statement must be considered but does not by itself 
establish the declarant’s authority under (C); the existence 
or scope of the relationship under (D); or the existence of 
the conspiracy or participation in it under (E). 
Reporter’s Observations: 
(1)  It is possible that the proviso—that the statement would be 
admissible if the declarant were to make the same statement at 
trial—is surplusage.  If the declarant would not be allowed to make 
the statement while testifying—for example, if the declarant lacked 
personal knowledge, or it was unduly prejudicial, or privileged—
then it should be excluded for independent reasons.  The other 
sources of exclusion are fully applicable to hearsay admitted under 
an exception.  But in order to avoid unanticipated problems, the 
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language cannot hurt.  Similar language is used in both the Kansas 
and Puerto Rico rules.84 
(2)  Some might object that amending Rule 801(d)(1) would be 
unsatisfactory because it would continue the pernicious category of 
“not hearsay” hearsay.  Rule 801(d)(1) categorizes prior witness 
statements, confoundingly, as “not hearsay” even though they 
clearly fit the definition of hearsay in Rule 801(c).  In reality, Rule 
801(d)(1) provides an exemption from the hearsay rule for these 
statements.  If you are going to make it an exception, it is 
conceptually better to call it an exception to the hearsay rule rather 
than to call something “not hearsay” when it actually fits the 
definition of hearsay.85  In 2010, the Advisory Committee 
considered a proposal from a law professor to move the Rule 
801(d) “not hearsay” categories into real hearsay exceptions.86  The 
Advisory Committee rejected the proposal on several grounds:  1) 
lawyers and courts have become familiar with “not hearsay” 
hearsay; 2) the question is one of nomenclature only, as there is no 
practical difference between hearsay admissible for its truth as “not 
hearsay” and hearsay admissible for its truth as “hearsay subject to 
an exception”; 3) moving the categories out of Rule 801(d) would 
impose costs of upsetting electronic searches and settled 
expectations with no corresponding practical benefit.  For all these 
reasons, any broadened hearsay exception for prior statements of 
witnesses should be placed in Rule 801(d)(1), as it is the least 
intrusive alternative and there is no good reason (other than a 
theoretical one) to change the category from “not hearsay” to a 
hearsay exception.87 
B.  Lifting the Congressional Limitation on Substantive Admissibility 
of Prior Inconsistent Statements 
That would be easy rulemaking: 
Rule 801.  Definitions That Apply to This Article; Exclusions from 
Hearsay. 
. . . 
(d) Statements That Are Not Hearsay.  A statement that meets the 
following conditions is not hearsay: 
 
 84. See supra notes 29–30 and accompanying text. 
 85. See Stephen A. Saltzburg, Restyling Choices and a Mistake, 53 WM. & MARY L. 
REV. 1517, 1523 (2012) (referring to the categories of statements covered by Rules 801(d)(1) 
and (2) as “nonhearsay hearsay”). 
 86. See Sam Stonefield, Rule 801(d)’s Oxymoronic “Not Hearsay” Classification:  The 
Untold Backstory and a Suggested Amendment, 5 FED. CTS. L. REV. 1 (2011). 
 87. See Daniel J. Capra, Appendix B:  The Restyled Rules of Federal Evidence, 53 WM. 
& MARY L. REV. 1528 (2011) for the Reporter’s memo on the proposed redesignation and 
realignment of prior witness statements.  The Advisory Committee’s rejection of the 
proposal is found in the minutes of the Advisory Committee meeting of October 12, 2010, 
on file with the author and available at www.uscourts.gov/rules-policies/records-and-
archives-rules-committees/meeting-minutes. 
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(1) A Declarant-Witness’s Prior Statement.  The declarant 
testifies and is subject to cross-examination about a prior 
statement, and the statement: 
(A) is inconsistent with the declarant’s testimony and 
was given under penalty of perjury at a trial, 
hearing, or other proceeding or in a deposition; 
(B) is consistent with the declarant’s testimony and is 
offered: 
(i) to rebut an express or implied charge 
that the declarant recently fabricated it 
or acted from a recent improper 
influence or motive in so testifying; or 
(ii) to rehabilitate the declarant’s credibility 
as a witness when attacked on another 
ground; or 
(C) identifies a person as someone the declarant 
perceived earlier. 
 
*     *     * 
C.  Narrowing the Limitation on Prior Inconsistent Statements 
to Address Concerns About Whether the Statement Was Ever Made 
This drafting alternative borrows from the states that already have such a 
provision. 
Rule 801.  Definitions That Apply to This Article; Exclusions from 
Hearsay. 
. . . 
(d) Statements That Are Not Hearsay.  A statement that meets the 
following conditions is not hearsay: 
(1) A Declarant-Witness’s Prior Statement.  The declarant 
testifies and is subject to cross-examination about a prior 
statement, and the statement: 
(A) is inconsistent with the declarant’s testimony and 
the declarant acknowledges under oath the 
making of the statement, or the statement was: 
(i) given under penalty of perjury at a trial, 
hearing, or other proceeding or in a 
deposition; 
(ii) written, adopted, or prepared 
electronically by the declarant; or 
(iii) a verbatim contemporaneous 
stenographic or electronic recording 
of the declarant’s oral statement; or 
(B) is consistent with the declarant’s testimony and is 
offered: 
(i) to rebut an express or implied charge 
that the declarant recently fabricated it 
or acted from a recent improper 
influence or motive in so testifying; or 
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(ii) to rehabilitate the declarant’s credibility 
as a witness when attacked on another 
ground; or 
(C) identifies a person as someone the declarant 
perceived earlier. 
Reporter’s Observations: 
(1)  It would be possible to craft language that would delete the 
congressional limitation and yet address its concerns by describing 
all the conditions in which there would be sufficient assurance that 
the statement was made.  But the congressional language has been 
in place for forty years and there is case law on it.  The better 
approach seems to be to retain the language as one means of 
satisfying the concern over whether a statement was made and then 
to provide additional grounds that justify a conclusion that the 
statement was made.  That process is similar to the one chosen in 
the 2014 amendment to Rule 801(d)(1)(B):  the original language 
was retained and new grounds for admissibility were added. 
(2)  The draft adds a provision that the statement is substantively 
admissible if the witness concedes at trial that he made the 
statement.  That should surely be enough to allay any concern that 
the statement was never made.  Under current law, even if the 
witness admits making the statement, it is not substantively 
admissible unless it was made under oath at a formal proceeding.  
This example shows that the congressional limitation is overkill in 
addressing the concern that a prior inconsistent statement was never 
made. 
(3)  The draft specifically addresses Professor Saltzburg’s point, made 
at the symposium, that prior inconsistent statements are difficult to 
cross-examine when the witness denies making them.  Under the 
draft, if the witness denies making the statement, it is not be 
substantively admissible unless there is proof that the declarant in 
fact made the statement.  Under that circumstance, cross-
examination can address why the witness is lying about not making 
the prior statement—a topic that may well be productive for the 
cross-examiner even if the witness adheres to his story.  After all, 
the opportunity to cross-examine does not have to be perfect to 
satisfy the concerns of the hearsay rule; it just has to be adequate.88  
Moreover, it is simply bad policy to allow a witness to veto the 
substantive admissibility of his prior inconsistent statement, simply 
by denying having made it when the evidence indicates to the 
contrary. 
CONCLUSION 
Theoretically, the rationales behind the hearsay rule—a concern over the 
inability to cross-examine the hearsay declarant and a preference for live 
 
 88. See generally United States v. Owens, 484 U.S. 554 (1988). 
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testimony—have no applicability to prior statements of testifying witnesses.  
It should follow that Federal Rule 801(c) should be amended so that prior 
witness statements would not be covered by the definition of hearsay.89  Yet 
that route is not chosen even by the systems that exempt prior witness 
statements from the coverage of the hearsay rule; and under the Federal 
Rules, such a change would result in an unnecessary disruption, given forty 
years of practice in which prior witness statements have been evaluated as 
hearsay, subject to an exemption for certain such statements.  Expansion of 
admissibility of prior witness statements is thus best accomplished by 
expanding the current hearsay exemption provided by Rule 801(d)(1). 
The question, then, is the scope of the expansion.  While theoretically the 
hearsay rule should not apply at all to prior witness statements, functionally 
there is a fair reason for maintaining the current limits on prior consistent 
statements.  The current rule—which ties hearsay proscription to 
rehabilitation—operates to limit strategic creation of prior consistent 
statements.  And while that goal is conceptually not a match with the 
hearsay rule, it is consistent with the Advisory Committee’s original 
conception for providing substantive admissibility of consistent statements.  
So any expansion should probably be focused on greater admissibility of 
prior inconsistent statements. 
There is much to be said for allowing substantive admissibility of all 
prior inconsistent statements, as many of the states have done.  But the 
concern over whether the statement was ever made, while not a hearsay 
concern, is one that has been invoked by lawyers and commentators for 
many years and is difficult to ignore.  The congressional limitation on 
substantive admissibility of prior inconsistent statements is, however, a 
patently overbroad and draconian solution to that concern.  Narrower 
protections employed by a number of states—allowing for substantive 
admissibility of prior inconsistent statements if admitted by the witness or if 
recorded—appropriately allow for greater substantive admissibility of prior 
inconsistent statements, while effectively addressing concerns about 
whether the statement was ever made. 
 
 89. Technically, such statements are called “not hearsay” under Rule 801(d)(1), but as 
discussed above, this designation operates as a hearsay exemption or exception—nonhearsay 
hearsay—because prior witness statements definitely fit within the definition of hearsay 
under Rule 801(c). 
